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Church Liability for Negligence
Valentine A. Toth*
T HE CHARITABLE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE is less than one hundred
years old.' During its relatively short history it has under-
gone many significant changes and qualifications. 2 Charitable
immunities were established and widened during a period of time
when charitable institutions, though mostly small and weak,
took upon themselves important social and charitable tasks.
3
These were the years when public policy demanded the pro-
tection of the charitable institutions for the welfare of the
general public.
4
After the first world war several courts took the charitable
immunity doctrine under close scrutiny. It was recognized by
them that many American charities had become large and
financially well supported organizations, able to indemnify those
who might be injured by their negligence. This recognition
prompted a few courts to abolish or to qualify the immunity
doctrine. 5
The third period in the history of the charitable immunity
doctrine started in 1942 and ended in 1958. The beginning of
this period was heralded by the often quoted opinion by Justice
Rutledge against the immunities granted to charitable institu-
tions." This period, during which important jurisdictions dis-
carded the immunity rule and many others qualified it, culni-
nated in the decisions of the New York and New Jersey courts
* Pastor of the United Church of Christ (Lorain, Ohio); Graduate of Univ.
of Kolozsvar (Roumania); Post-Graduate work at Kaiser Wilhelm Univ.(Berlin), and the Central European Institute (Vienna); a Senior at Cleve-
land-Marshall Law School.
1 McDonald v. Mass. General Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
2 Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations, 110 (1956); Restatement
of Torts, Ch. 45, § 887 (1939); Bruce v. Y. M. C. A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 P.
798, 802 (1929).
3 Annual Survey of American Law, 396 (1957).
4 Ibid.
5 Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879);
Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N. W. 463 (1928);
Bruce v. Central Methodist Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N. W. 951 (1907);
Downes v. Harper Hosp., 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894); Andrews v.
Y. M. C. A. of Des Moines, 126 Iowa 374, 284 N. W. 186, 205 (1939).
6 The President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 App.
D. C. 123, 130 F. 2d 810 (App. D. C. 1942).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1962
11 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
which abolished the immunities of all charities.' In this period
courts and legal writers alike were almost unanimous in their
prognostications that the days of charitable immunity were
numbered."
The fourth, and so far the last period of the history of these
immunities started with the enactment of statutory law in New
Jersey by which the charitable immunity doctrine has been
re-established in that state.9 Other enactments and attempts
were made by other state legislatures, declaring or indicating
that charitable immunities must be kept alive.10 As a conse-
quence several state courts have lost their bold and legally
sound approaches to this tangled and difficult problem.1 Con-
trary to earlier indications, they refused to widen the field of
liability and declared that any drastic change must come from the
legslature.12 Proponents of the immunity doctrine were quick to
warn against any change by court-made law, and demanded, in a
series of legal articles, not only the maintenance but also the
widening of this rule. 13
This fourth period has put an end in many jurisdictions, at
least for the time being, to desirable and expected changes to-
ward greater or total liability.14 In other jurisdictions qualifying
decisions and new approaches could be expected.15
7 Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N. J. 29, 141 A. 2d 276
(1958); Benton v. Y. M. C. A. of Westfield, 27 N. J. 67, 141 A. 2d 298
(1958); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N. Y. 2d 656, 163 N. Y. S. 2d 312 (1957).
8 Ball, The Liability of Charitable Institutions for Torts of Agents and
Servants, 38 Ky. L. J. 105 (1949-50); Browne, Immunity from Tort Li-
ability: A Church as a Charitable Institution, 36 Univ. of Detroit L. Rev.
169 (1958); Orlowsky, Charitable Immunity-The Road to Destruction, 32
Temple L. Q. 86, 99 (1958); Freezer, Tort Liabilities of Charities, 77 Univ.
of Pa. L. Rev. 191 (1928).
9 N. J. Stat. Ann. § 16: 1-53 (1958); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2 A: 53 A-78 (1959).
10 Morris, Recent Developments in Ohio's Charitable Immunity Law, 10
Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 402, 420 (1961).
11 Smith v. Duval City Welfare Board, 118 S. 2d 98 (Fla. 1960); Gibbon v.
Y. M. C. A., 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N. E. 2d 563 (1961).
12 Joachim, The Policymakers: Courts or Legislatures?, 39 Boston Univ. L.
Rev. 149 (1951); Brody, Modifying Charitable Immunity, 41 Boston Univ.
L. Rev. 199 (1961); Simeone, Doctrine of Charitable Immunity, 5 St. Louis
Univ. L. J. 357 (1959).
13 Joachim, Charitable Immunity: Why Abandon the Doctrine of Stare
Decisis?, 45 A. B. A. J. 822 (1959); Joachim, Liability for Charitable Insti-
tutions?, 63 Dick. L. Rev. 57 (1958).
14 Smith v. Duval City Welfare Board, supra n. 11; Gibbon v. Y. M. C. A.,
supra n. 11.
15 Browne, supra n. 8.
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CHURCH NEGLIGENCE
Churches are greatly affected by these legal developments.
While it is true that the hottest controversy is centered around
hospitals, YMCAs, and other charitable institutions, it is equally
true that thousands of churches and millions of church-goers
and church members are and will be affected by it.'6
Since the church enjoys the greatest measure of this im-
munity rule, it is almost imperative that during this new period
the basic and pertinent problems of church immunity should
be categorized and surveyed in order to show the lack of justi-
fication for this privileged position. These problems may be
divided into four categories: (1) the modern church as a charity;
(2) constitutionality; (3) legality; (4) the social necessity of
church immunity.17
These classifications can shed proper light upon the present
status and the future developments of this doctrine.
I. Clarification of Basic Issues.
1. The religious society as a charity.
In order to bring churches under the protection of the doc-
trine of charitable immunities a satisfactory answer must be
given to the question: Is the church in the legal sense a chari-
table organization? At least two American courts 8 have looked
to the more than 350 year old Statute of Elizabeth 9 and to the
English court interpretations to supply them with a rationale.
In construing that statute, the English courts have held that
organizations which perform functions wholly analogous, are
deemed within its spirit and intendment, are charitable in the
legal sense, and that a religious society is charitable insofar as
its objects serve charitable religious purposes implied in the
statutes, i.e., those which tend directly or indirectly towards
the instruction or edification of the public.20 In the United States
the classic legal definition of charities was given by Justice
Gray in Jackson v. Phillips.21 This definition, generally followed
16 Holcomb, Torts-Charitable Institutions Other Than Hospitals--Liability
of Y. M. C. A. for Negligence, 29 Univ. of Cincinnati L. Rev. 522 (1960);
Bell v. The Salvation Army, 172 Ohio St. 326, 173 N. E. 2d 106 (1961);
Landis: Yearbook of the American Churches for 1959, 288 (1958).
17 Pfeiffer, Church, State and Freedom (1953); Gilkey, State Intervention
in Matters of Religion, 27 Kan. L. R. 41 (1958).
18 Montgomery v. Carlton, 99 Fla. 152, 126 So. 135 (1930); Gladding v. St.
Mathew's Church, 25 R. I. 628, 57 A. 860 (1904).
19 Charitable Gift Acts, 43 Eliz. 1. c. 4 (1601).
20 4 Halsbury, Laws of England, Charities, 212, 221-222 (3d ed., 1952).
21 14 Allen 539 (Mass. 1867).
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by the American courts, as well as the English court interpre-
tations, are in agreement that churches are included in the
category of legally recognized charities.
The majority of American courts look beyond the religious
aspects of the church, and find it engaged in other benevolent
and charitable activities such as to qualify it for charitable
status on a wider basis than its religious nature alone. 22 In
Bianchi v. South Park23 the highest court of New Jersey says:
The church function . . . is not limited to sectarian teaching
and worship. In modern view, exercises designed to aid
in the advancement of the spiritual, moral, ethical and
cultural life of the community in general are deemed within
the purview of the religious society.
This legal recognition of the charitable character of the
church enables legislatures and courts alike to grant to churches
tax exemptions, tort immunities and other privileges, without
exposing themselves to constitutional attacks.
2. Is the church immunity rule constitutional?
In 1956 the Washington Law Review2 4 raised this interesting
and slightly embarrassing question: Would an immunity from
tort liability granted to churches constitute a violation of the
separation of church and state under the Federal Constitution?
Could this grant be considered to be state action and aid given
to churches?
This question, to this writer's best knowledge, was never
authoritatively answered. In construing the "establishment of
religion" clause of the First Amendment, the United States
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, said this: 25
The "establishment of religion" of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the federal govern-
ment can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another.
In a dissenting opinion Justice Black goes even a step further
and points out that26
22 Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, supra n. 5; Bianchi v. South Park
Presb. Church, 123 N. J. L. 325, 8 A. 2d 567 (1939).
23 Id. (Bianchi) at 580.
24 Comment, 31 Wash. L. R. 287, 298 (1956).
25 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 18 (1946).
26 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 318 (1951).
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A state policy of aiding "all religions" necessarily requires
a governmental decision as to what constitutes a religion.
... Thus is created a governmental power to hinder certain
religious beliefs by denying their character as such ...
This provides precisely the kind of censorship which we have
said the Constitution forbids.
The first part of this constitutional problem, namely whether
the granting of immunities would constitute state action or aid,
hardly could find a legally correct direct answer. This is the
reason why many courts hasten to point out that churches are
entitled to these immunities not because of their religious but
because of their general charitable character.
2 7
The second part of the constitutional problem, namely the
constitutional prohibition against determining by governmental
power what constitutes a religion, is usually bypassed by a legal
fiction.
According to this legal fiction, in the eyes of the law a church
is divided into two artificial entities.2 One is the religious cor-
poration and the other, the spiritual church. Although each of
these two bodies, viz.: the religious corporation and the spiritual
church, may exist within the pale of the other, they are in no
respect correlatives. 29 Thus, when the church is sued in negli-
gence, the religious corporation, and not the spiritual church,
is the defendant. This legal fiction helps the courts in two ways.
First, in the immunity states they do not have to determine what
constitutes a religion; they only go so far as to decide what
constitutes a religious corporation or an unincorporated religious
society. On the other hand, in the liability states a judgment
can be rendered against a church without interference with the
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. With recognition
of the charitable character of churches, and with the help of this
legal fiction, state courts have been able to deal with church
related tort problems without meeting insurmountable constitu-
tional difficulties.
3. Is the church immunity rule legally sound?
Under general principles of tort law, liability for negligence
or tortious conduct is the general rule. Any immunity is an
27 Browne, supra n. 8.
28 Harlem Church v. N. Y. Greater Corporation of Seventh Day Adventists,
260 N. Y. S. 517, 521, 198 N. E. 615 (1932); Bennet v. LaGrange, 153 Ga. 428,
112 S. E. 482, 486 (1922).
29 Master v. Second Parish of Portland, 36 F. Supp. 918, 925 (D. C., D. Me.,
S. D., 1940), 124 F. 2d 622; 45 Am. Jur. 727.
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exception. It is also a general principle that absence of a fee
or price is no defense to tort.
30
American courts find a foundation for the immunity rule in
stare decisis, in various legal theories, and in public policy con-
siderations.
(a) Stare decisis. The immunities of charitable institutions
were first announced in the United States by the Massachusetts
high court.3 1 The Massachusetts court followed a short lived
English rule which was based on a dictum in Lord Cottenham's
opinion.3 2 This immunity rule in England was held to be the
law in 1846. 33 In 1861 the English rule was applied to churches
also and the English high court held that the vestry of a parish
was immune from tort liability.3 4 But this rule in England was
overruled shortly after this decision, 35 and was eliminated from
the development of the English common law.
3 6
When the question of charitable immunity was first raised
in the United States,3 7 the Massachusetts court based its decision
on the early English immunity rule,38 without recognizing that
it already had been overruled. Other American decisions
followed the McDonald rule, and the immunity of charities was
gradually accepted by American jurisdictions.
Today, the proponents of stare decisis try to minimize the
effect of the early English decisions on the development of the
American immunity doctrine, and declare that not the overruled
English decisions but sound public policy demands the following
of the early American holdings.3 9 Opponents of charitable im-
munities point out, on the other hand, the legal weakness of
the early American decisions and the fact that the immunity
doctrine in its inception was purely court-made law, and that
30 Orlowsky, supra n. 8; Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q. B. 503, 509 (1883).
31 McDonald v. Mass. General Hosp., supra n. 1.
32 The Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 12 Clark & F. 507, 8 Eng. Rep.
1508 (1846).
33 Ibid; Duncan v. Findlater, 6 C&F 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839).
34 Hollyday v. St. Leonard, 11 C&F (N. S.) 192 (1861).
35'Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 214, 142 Eng. Rep. 769
.(1871); Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L. R. 1 H. L. 93, 11 Eng. Rep.
1500 (1866).
36 Marshall v. Lindsley County Council, 1 K. B. 516 (1935).
37 McDonald v. Mass. General Hosp., supra n. 1.
38 Hollyday v. St. Leonard, supra n. 34.
39 Joachim, Charitable Immunity, 38 Mich. S. B. J. 14 (1959).
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thus the courts are the ones which should abolish it and not
the legislature.
40
(b) Could legal theories supply "the firm foundation"?
American courts accepted or developed several legal theories in
order to furnish the necessary legal foundation for the immunities
of churches and other charitable corporations. Some of these
could be applied to churches; others are applicable only to other
charities. 4
1
The trust fund theory. This theory, which is readily applied
to churches, was originally developed by Lord Cottenham in his
famous dictum.42 It holds that
to give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply
it to those objects whom the author of the trust had in view,
but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose.
According to this theory the assets of non-profit organizations
are "trust funds" and may not be used to pay damages, since this
would destroy the purpose for which the funds are supposed to
be given and to be used. This theory seems to supply the legal
foundation for the doctrine in most immunity states.43 The basic
weakness of this theory is that it runs directly contrary to the
basic principles of the law of trusts. As Prof. Prosser points out,
among other legal writers, trust funds are not exempted from
liability for torts committed in administering the trust, and since
the fund would not be exempt in the hands of the donor himself,
the donor can scarcely confer such immunity upon the trustees.44
This theory really does not confer total immunity upon
charities, but will prevent satisfaction of judgments where the
satisfaction would deplete the "trust fund." Despite its legal
weakness, this theory could be very useful where churches
voluntarily purchase liability insurance, since it enables the
courts to render judgments against churches up to the amount
of the insurance. Such a judgment gives at least partial in-
40 Brown, Stare Decisis is Worth Its Weight in Reason: Abolish the Charita-
ble Immunity Doctrine, 46 A. B. A. J. 629 (1960).
41 Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 2.
42 Herriot's Hosp. v. Ross, supra n. 32, at 513.
43 Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885); Davis v. Central Congreg.
Society, 129 Mass. 367 (1880); Bruce v. Y. M. C. A., supra n. 2: Williams
Adm'x v. Church Home for Females and Infirmary for Sick, 223 Ky. 355,
3 S. W. 2d 753 (1928).
44 Prosser, Law of Torts, 785 (2d ed. 1955): Zollman, Damage Liability of
Charitable Institutions, 19 Mich. L. R. 395 (1921).
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demnity to the injured person, and prevents depletion of the
"trust funds."
The "exemption to the respondeat superior" theory. This
theory holds that a charity obtains no direct benefit from its
agents and employees and, thus, a charity is not liable for the
torts of its agents or servants.45 Some jurisdictions which adhere
to this unrealistic theory hold that a charity performs its whole
duty when it tenders a competent servant to a beneficiary and
that thereafter such a servant becomes the servant of the bene-
ficiary rather than the servant of the charity. 46 The tender of
a competent servant is, in most cases, the basis of the theory,
and churches are often liable even in the immunity states when
they are proved to have been negligent in the hiring of their
servants.47 An incompetent servant can subject a church to
liability, even when hired with due care, especially in those
cases where the injured person was not a recipient of the
church's benefits.48 The application of this theory could be met
with disapproval especially on the part of those denominations
which are under episcopal church government. The Roman
Catholic church holds that
The scope of the bishop's authority can by no means be
limited to strictly religious matters, but extends to questions
of whatever nature which concern directly or indirectly the
welfare of the church and the salvation of souls. 49
Under this and similar church governments, the churches
themselves deny that their clergymen, officers and employees
would ever become the servants of the beneficiaries and not of
the denomination.
This is one of the reasons why many courts disregard this
theory and hold churches liable for the negligence of their
officers and servants. In cases where the bishop has title to the
45 25 A. L. R. 65-67; Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135
N. E. 2d 410 (1956).
46 Zollman, supra n. 44, at 412.
47 Bruce v. Central Methodist Church, supra n. 5.
48 Miss. Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951); Wad-
dell v. Y. M. C. A., 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N. E. 2d 140 (1938); Cullen v. Smith,
139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N. E. 2d 146 (1942); Durney v. St. Francis Hosp., 7
Terry 350, 46 Del. 350, 83 A. 2d 753 (1951); Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356,
232 P. 2d 241 (1950); Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 27 Cal. 2d 802, 167 P.
2d 729 (1946); Silva v. Providence Hosp., 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1939);
Roman Cath. Church v. Keenan, 74 Ariz. 20, 243 P. 2d 455 (1952).
49 Acta Apostolica Sedis 14-7: Benedict XV, Letter, 15 Oct. 1921.
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church property he is the defendant as a corporation sole. In
Casey v. The Roman Cath. Archbishop of Baltimore"° the court
held that the archbishop was not a defendant in his capacity as
a spiritual church leader, but that in his corporate capacity he
was answerable as the master of a negligent employee. In a
recent decision5 ' the Ohio Supreme Court rendered judgment
against a bishop. The reasoning of the Court was similar to the
reasoning of the preceding case.
Several court decisions point out that by the force of his
election or appointment a clergyman does not become an agent
or an officer of the local religious corporation. 52 He could only
become the agent or an officer of the local religious corporation
if the local church elects or appoints him to such an office, or
where he is made an agent or an officer by the charter or by-laws
of the religious corporation.53 When a clergyman or a layman is
elected or appointed by the religious corporation to a corporate
office, a rule promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court may
apply, especially where the church is governed by the "congre-
gational system." According to this rule charities are unlike
other masters. Their right to control agents and servants is
greatly diminished by the fact that their servants are either
volunteer workers or professional persons who won't necessarily
follow or even accept the orders of the charities.54
The "waiver theory." This legal theory holds that one who
accepts the benefits of a charity waives his rights to collect
damages from that institution for the torts of its servants or
agents. Prior to basic changes, this fictional agreement theory
was followed by courts in New York, California and Michigan. 55
This theory is based on "the intentional or voluntary relinquish-
50 217 Md. 595, 143 A. 2d 628 (1955).
51 Blankenship v. Alter, Archbishop Trustee, 171 Ohio St. 65, 167 N. E.
2d 922 (1960).
52 Fiske v. Beatty, 201 N. Y. S. 441 (1923), 238 N. Y. 598, 144 N. E. 907
(1924); Russian-Serbian Holy Trinity Church v. Kulik, 202 Minn. 560, 279
N. W. 364 (1938); Gibson v. Trustees of Pencader Presb. Church, 25 Del.
Ch. 317, 20 A. 2d 134 (1941); Master v. Second Parish of Portland, supra
n. 29; Casey v. R. Cath. Archbishop of Baltimore, supra n. 50.
53 Fiske v. Beatty, supra n. 52; N. Y. Relig. Corp. L. (Consol. Law, Ch. 52,
§ 2, 1951); N. J. Stat. Ann. T. 16 (1939).
54 Morris, supra n. 10 at 416.
55 Bruce v. Central Methodist Church, supra n. 5; Hosp. of Saint Vincent
de Paul v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13 (1914); Oleck, op. cit. supra
n. 2, at 110; Restatement of Torts, Ch. 45, § 887 (1939).
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ment of a known right; or such conduct as warrants an inference
of the relinquishment of such right."56 Massachusetts, Michigan
and Virginia courts find the basis of the waiver in an implied
contract. While it is true that in the case of hospitals and their
patients some important elements of an implied contract may be
present, it is difficult to find any implied contract between
churches and the recipients of their usual benefits.5 7 As applied
to churches, the other weakness of the theory is the fact that
a right must be known before it can be relinquished. In negli-
gence cases a person must be aware of some obvious danger
before he can waive his right to protection. Otherwise he finds
himself waiving rights which he never dreamed existed. While
an average church-goer cannot be fit into this category, the
theory still might be applied to some volunteer church workers
who may be aware of some obvious dangers while performing
repair work and other manual labor for his church. In such a
case, and apparently only in such a case, he may impliedly re-
linquish his right to protection. Parallel with this theory some
courts speak of the "assumption of risk" theory also. But as
Professor Prosser and other legal writers point out, the risk
cannot be assumed in such situations where there is no general
awareness of some obvious or ordinary risk.5
"Governmental immunity" theory. This theory claims that
charitable institutions are entitled to the same immunities as
those given to state and other public agencies, since charities
are instrumentalities brought to life to aid in the performance
of semi-governmental or public duties. 59 Applied to churches,
this theory is constitutionally vulnerable and subject to ob-
jections from both state and church.60 The Federal Tort Claims
Act6' weakened it by implication with respect to the agents of
other charities also.0 2
56 Rand v. Morse, 289 F. 339, 344 (8 Cir. 1923).
57 Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 2, at 110.
68 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 44, at 307 and 310.
59 Univ. of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S. W. 219 (1907);
Fordyce v. Woman's Christian Nat. Library Ass., 79 Ark. 550, 96 S. W. 155
(1906); Ghiardi, Personal Injury Commentator (1960 annual).
60 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
61 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401,
2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1952 Supp.).
62 Status of Immunity Doctrine in the States, 5 Cath. Univ. L. Rev. 100
(1948).
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"Public policy" theory. This is more forthright than any of
the other theories. It holds simply and bluntly that it is better
for the public welfare if the injured person, rather than the
charity, bears the burden of losses caused by the torts of agents
or servants of charities.6 3 This pronouncement receives contro-
versial treatment by courts and legal writers alike. 64 Its oppo-
nents point out the lack of current justification, the nature of
modern charities, the availability of liability insurance policy,
and the legal unsoundness of the public policy itself. They
demand that, since this public policy was first declared by courts,
it should be changed by court-made law.65 The highest court of
New Jersey clearly accepted these arguments when it reversed
itself and declared that from now on the public policy of that
state would not recognize charitable immunities.6 6 At least two
important court decisions recognized this as early as 1928 and
1939 The Minnesota Supreme court discarded the immunity
rule in 1928 in a blistering opinion:
Charitable institutions must first compensate those who are
injured and damaged by the negligence of their officers and
servants ... before going farther afield to dispensate charity
and to do good . . . Charitable, benevolent, and religious
institutions have been and are doing immeasurable service
for the physical and moral welfare of humanity. They should
be encouraged and aided that their work may be done with-
out injustice to others. They are relieved partly or wholly
from the burden of taxation, but it would not be good public
policy to relieve them from liability for torts or negligence.
Where innocent persons suffer through their fault, they
should not be exempted. . . . It is almost contradictory to
hold that an institution organized to dispense charity shall
be charitable and extend aid to others, but shall not com-
pensate or aid those injured by it in carrying on its activi-
ties.68
63 Torts: Charitable Immunity-Current Status of the Charitable Immunity
Doctrine, 36 Notre Dame Lawyer 93 (1960); Joachim, supra n. 12.
64 Joachim, supra n. 13; contra: Brown, supra n. 40; Orlowski, supra n. 8.
65 State v. Culvert, 23 N. J. 493, 503, 129 A. 2d 298 (1957); Benton v.
Y. M. C. A. of Westfield, supra n. 7; Lokar v. Church of Sacred Heart, 24
N. J. 549, 133 A. 2d 12'(1957); The President and Directors of Georgetown
College v. Hughes, supra n. 6.
66 Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, supra n. 7, at 287.
67 Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, supra n. 5; Andrews v. Y. M. C. A. of
Des Moines, supra n. 5.
68 Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, supra n. 5.
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The Iowa Supreme Court went to the root of the "public
policy" problem and took a similar position in Andrews v.
Y.M.C.A.:
We do not believe that either sound reason or logic, or sound
principles of law, or the demands of sound present day
public policy, justify those adjudications . . . (which sustain
the immunity of charities) .... It is significant that public
policy has never demanded legislation exempting charitable
institutions from responsibility for their negligence ...
When a legislature has not granted an exemption, it may be
questionable whether the courts have such power. If they
do grant such an exemption ... it is only because the sound
public policy of that state demands it .... But public policy
is not static. It changes as the needs of the people, the mode
of their living, and the manner and methods of doing busi-
ness change.6 9
Any objective review of the legal theories used to grant to
churches certain important immunities under the law of torts
indicates that the charitable immunity doctrine is legally unsound
and should be discarded in its entirety. Recent changes in
public policy as expressed by legislatures and cautious court
decisions are, nonetheless, obvious signs that at least in some
jurisdictions we must live with this unsound and outdated doc-
trine. These legal theories, although unsound in many respects,
will thus be used in some form in the majority of our juris-
dictions. The results obtained by these courts will vary with
the jurisdiction's theory as to immunity.70
4. Is church immunity socially desirable?
One of the proponents of the immunity rule points out, in
a recent article, that the American courts were led by sound
considerations and not merely by an overruled early English
decision in adopting this rule. 71 This argument has great
historical validity, but it cannot be accepted today. Nobody
would discard this rule only to correct a historical error 72 if by
its maintenance the public good would still be served. It is
admitted that in the last century public policy had to protect
charities and churches in order to enable them to perform their
69 Andrews v. Y. M. C. A. of Des Moines, supra n. 5, at 205.
70 Ghiardi, op. cit. supra n. 59.
71 Joachim, Questionable Status of Charitable Immunity, 32 Conn. B. J.
330, 343 (1958); Joachim, supra n. 12.
72 Andrews v. Y. M. C. A. of Des Moines, supra n. 5.
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desirable and semi-public duties. At the inception of the Ameri-
can immunity rule, churches and other charities were small
and financially weak. For lack of important social legislation
in the interest of public good, they had to take upon themselves
certain tasks which taxed their financial structures. Any law
suit which would have resulted in the award of substantial
damages would not only have hindered them in the performance
of these duties but would have wiped out many of these charities
during times of great public need. This justification of the im-
munity rule today does not exist. This lack of current justifi-
cation is pointed out by some courts by drawing a historical
parallel between the charitable organizations of the past century
and "modern huge institutions." 73 They are capable of carrying
financial burdens and can inflict many injuries. For this reason
alone, says the Supreme Court of Florida, today "a charitable
institution should be just before being charitable or generous. '74
Recent publications, treatises and articles alike are practically
unanimous in their demand for application of the rules of the
law of torts to all charities. The New York court, in discarding
the immunity rule, pointed out that modern life does not support
the social desirability of such a protection, and said:
The rule of non-liability is out of tune with the life about
us, at variance with modern-day needs, and with concepts
of justice and fair dealing. It should be discarded. 74
The New Jersey Supreme Court stressed that when social
desirability of a legal doctrine ceases, it should be abolished:
One of the greatest virtues of the common law is its dynamic
nature that makes it adaptable to the requirements of society
at the time of its application in court.75
Courts in discarding the immunity rule attempted on several
occasions to answer the basic question: What is more desirable
for the public: the immunity rule (when the injured individual)
or the liability rule (when the charity) suffers the loss? A fairly
recent legal publication summarizes the answers of many juris-
dictions by stating that:
73 Ibid.; Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220, 229
(1957).
74 Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344, 348 (1940);
Bing v. Thunig, supra n. 7, at 11; Annual Survey of American Law, op cit.
supra n. 3.
75 State v. Culvert, supra n. 65, at 503.
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Charitable immunity may at one time have been necessary
as a "protective tariff" for charities, but, in view of the
relatively strong economic position of most charities today,
and the availability of liability insurance at a modest cost,
the reason for the rule has disappeared. Under such cir-
cumstances it is well within the proper sphere of the judici-
ary to discard the doctrine. 6
Besides the lack of current justification some courts point
out the moral insufficiency of the immunity rule. Dissenting
opinions sometimes call it "protected negligence," saying that
it is an anomaly that the institutional doer of good asks
exemption from responsibility for his own wrong, though
all others must pay. The incorporated charity must respond
as do private individuals, business corporations and others,
when it does good in a wrong way.77
Justice Cohen of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gives the
only possible answer to the question: Who should bear the loss?
. . . the party whose blameworthy conduct has caused injury
to another must compensate the innocent party therefor.78
The reason for this and other similar answers is furnished
by a dissenting justice of the Kentucky high court who said:
if the immunity doctrine should be sweepingly applied
then this court has created an artificial individual, who like
in ancient tyrannical days can do no wrong.79
The undesirable social and legal effects of "protected negli-
gence" prompted the Congress itself to pass the Federal Tort
Claims Act of 1946. The Act says in essence that claims may be
allowed against the United States for injury or loss
by negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the government while acting within the scope of his
employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private citizen, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred s0
Similar enactments by state legislations concerning
charitable institutions would put an end to this controversial
issue. Such legislation, unfortunately, is still not forthcoming.
76 Annual Survey of American Law, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 396.
77 Knecht v. St. Mary's Hosp., 392 Pa. 75, 140 A. 2d 30, 40 (1958).
78 Ibid.
79 Emery v. Jewish Hosp. Ass., 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577 (1921).
80 Federal Tort Claims Act, supra n. 61.
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On the contrary, recent developments have revealed that state
legislatures are the foremost bastions of the charitable immunity
rule.8 '
H. Present and Future Developments.
1. Most courts would find a satisfactory solution, if . . .
After 1942, but especially between 1950 and 1958, most
American jurisdictions recognized the need for a change in
charitable immunities and some courts rejected them in their
entirety, while others promised early rejection or pierced the
shield of non-liability with many qualifications. 8 2 This trend is
closely connected with one of the most exhaustive and often-
quoted anti-immunity decisions in this field. In 1942 Justice
Rutledge, in The President and Directors of Georgetown Uni-
versity v. Hughes, surveyed the whole field of charitable im-
munities and proved that they were historically unfounded,
legally unsound and socially undesirable.8 3 Justice Rutledge
had this to say:
Paradoxes of principle, fictional assumptions of fact and
consequence and confused result characterize judicial dis-
position of these claims. . . . From full immunity, through
varied but inconsistent qualifications to general responsibility
is the gamut of decisions. The cases are almost riotous with
dissent. Reasons are even more varied than results. These
are earmarks of law in flux. They indicate something wrong
at the beginning or that something has become wrong since
then. They also show that correction, though in process, is
also incomplete . 4
This famous and often quoted opinion intensified the legal
struggle of judges and legal writers against the immunity rule
which had been under attack practically since its inception. 5
The first qualifying decisions in the wake of strong demands for
its complete abolition did not affect churches in any great
degree. 1 Hospitals were the primary targets of these decisions.
81 Conn. S. J., 1955 Sess. 550-563; R. I. Gen. Laws, Ch. 116 § 95 (1938); N. J.
Stat. Ann. supra n. 9.
82 Browne, supra n. 8.
83 The President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, supra
n. 6.
84 Ibid.
85 Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., supra n. 45; Pierce v. Yakima Valley Me-
morial Hosp. Assn., 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765 (1953); Lyon v. Turn-
water Ev. Free Church, 47 Wash. 2d 202, 287 P. 2d 128 (1955).
86 Freezer, Tort Liabilities of Charities, 77 Univ. of Penna. L. R. 191 (1928).
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In 1950 and 1951 scores of states started to swing the pendulum
towards total liability. The California high court in 1950 re-
voked the immunity doctrine and held a church liable for the
injury of children sustained while driven home from Bible
School."7 Arizona followed suit and repudiated the immunity doc-
trine, making hospitals and churches liable for their negligent
acts.88 In 1951 Delaware overruled its earlier decisions and made
charities subject to the doctrine of respondeat superior even when
their servants were selected with proper care. 9 In the same
year Mississippi held that charities were only liable for the
negligent selection or retention of their servants, but the high
court approvingly observed the availability of liability insur-
ance.90 In 1952 Alaska rejected the legal theories of charitable
immunity rule, and in 1954 renewed its earlier decision making
charities liable for their negligence. 9' Kansas in 1953 rejected
the tort immunities of hospitals, and in 1954 repudiated the
whole rule.92 In the same year Washington abrogated the im-
munity rule as applied to hospitals, and in 1956 a very similar
rule was promulgated by the Ohio high court. 93 In 1955 Nevada
limited the immunity of churches and other charities to their
beneficiaries.9 4 In the folowing year Idaho overruled the "waiver
theory" and held charitable hospitals liable to paying patients.9 5
During the same years other jurisdictions have moved toward
liability in some degree.
The most important effect however, was attributed to the
decisions of the New York and New Jersey high courts which
completely rejected the whole immunity rule." The decisions
of these two jurisdictions have often been followed or at least
favorably observed by other states on many other occasions.
87 Malloy v. Fong, supra n. 48.
88 Roman Cath. Church v. Keenan, 74 Ariz. 20, 243 P. 2d 455 (1952); Ray v.
Tucson Medical Center, supra n. 73.
89 Durney v. St. Francis Hosp., supra n. 48.
90 Miss. Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, supra n. 48.
91 Moats v. Sisters of Charity of Providence, 13 Alaska 546 (1952); Tuengel
v. City of Sitka, 118 F. Supp. 399 (D. C. Alaska, 1954).
92 Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954).
93 Pierce v. Yakima Valley Hosp. Assn., supra n. 85; Avellone v. St. John's
Hosp., supra n. 45.
94 Springer v. Federated Church of Reno, 71 Nev. 177, 283 P. 2d 1071 (1955).
95 Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Saints Hosp., 78 Idaho 63, 297 P. 2d 1042
(1956).
96 Bing v. Thunig, supra n. 7; Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary,
supra n. 7.
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For this reason their new public policy was heralded by legal
writers as a sure sign of the impending defeat of the immunity
rule in American jurisdictions.9
These expectations, alas, were premature and over-optimistic.
It is true that in 1958 most courts were ready to weaken or
to discard the immunity doctrine. At this point, however, some
state legislatures entered the field and in two states, by statutory
law, the liability doctrine was reinstated, and in many other
states the courts decided to wait for legislative changes and not
to go beyond the narrow issues presented by given cases. These
developments have changed the prognostications of legal
writers.98 The charitable immunity doctrine is very much alive
in some form in the majority of our jurisdictions and it can
not be expected any more that it will swiftly and completely
disappear from the American legal system.99
2. Statutory laws favor immunities
Since 1958 it has become more obvious than ever that courts
cannot deal with the problem of charitable immunity without
interference from state legislatures. This was the year when
the New Jersey state legislation re-established, to a great extent,
the immunity rule discarded in the earlier part of the same
year by the highest state court.100 Since 1958 this reenactment
has often been used by the proponents of charitable immunities
to remind the courts that any change in public policy should
come from the legislature 10 1 These arguments in favor of legis-
lative changes are mainly based on two contentions. The first
contention desires to maintain stare decisis and maintains that
since the American immunity rule is based on a sound and justifi-
able public policy this public policy cannot be changed short of
legislative action. 10 2 The second contention deals with the retro-
spective effect of a court rule. According to this, if courts would
abolish the charitable immunity rule, litigants whose claims are
not barred by the Statutes of Limitations would enfore prior
97 Simeone, Doctrine of Charitable Immunity, 5 St. Louis Univ. L. R. 357(1959); Brown, supra n. 40.
98 Gibbon v. Y. M. C. A., supra n. 41; Tomasella v. St. Cecilia Church, 6
Ohio Op. 2d 508 (1958).
99 Rosen v. Concordia Ev. Lutheran Church, 167 N. E. 2d 671 (Ohio App.
1960); Smith v. Duval City Welfare Board, supra n. 11.
100 N. J. Stat. Ann., supra n. 9.
101 Joachim, supra n. 13.
102 Gibbon v. Y. M. C. A., supra n. 41; Md. Ann. Code, Art. 48 A § 85 (1951);
Joachim, supra n. 13.
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rights again against the charities. Although especially this second
point has validity, the real reason for these demands is obviously
different; advocates of the immunities know that legislatures
apparently favor the immunity rule. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court was the first in the United States which abrogated the
immunity doctrine. The legislature reinstated it. 10 3 Several
attempts were made by some state legislators to abolish the
charitable immunity rule by statutes, but their attempts were
rejected. Such a futile attempt was made, for instance, in 1955
in Connecticut. 0 4 In another immunity state, in Indiana in 1959
a bill was introduced to make eleemosynary institutions liable for
injuries caused by negligence of employees or officers. This
bill was defeated also.105 In Ohio the General Assembly enacted
Substitute Senate Bill No. 241 granting immunity to non-profit
organizations operated for religious, charitable, educational and
hospital purposes. It was vetoed by the governor and the House
was unable to override it. In 1961 the Ohio Legislature re-
enacted S. B. 241 into S. B. 187; the bill did not become law.10
It is interesting that the bill restored to hospitals some measure
of immunity, making them liable only for the gross negligence of
their servants, but reduced all other charitable institutions to the
same status, thus overruling the immunity granted such charities
by the Gibbons case and earlier decisions. 10 7 Actual or possible
legislative actions have made the courts of several jurisdictions
very cautious. Not only in the so-called immunity states but in
some other jurisdictions where qualified immunity is the rule,
courts often decline to change public policy and bluntly declare
that any drastic change must come from the legislature. An
earlier policy declaration of the Massachusetts high court exem-
plifies the reluctance of some jurisdictions to making sweeping
changes:
In previous decisions we have indicated as firmly as we
can that any abolition of this rule must be by the Legis-
lature. l0 8
Arkansas, another immunity state, is similarly unwilling to
change the immunity rule by court decisions. Any change should
103 Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp., 12 R. I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879); R. I.
Gen. Laws Ann. § 95 (1938).
104 S. B. 597, 1955 Sess., Conn. S. Journal, 1955 Sess. 550.
105 Joachim, supra n. 71.
106 Substitute Senate Bill 241 (1959); Senate Bill 187 (1961).
107 Ibid.; Morris, supra n. 10.
108 Barrett v. Brooks Hosp. Inc., 338 Mass. 754, 157 N. E. 2d 638 (1959).
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come from the legislature, declares the highest state court.
Oregon 0 9 and Nevada, 110 where immunity is limited to bene-
ficiaries, Mississippi11 and other qualified-immunity states, leave
eventual changes to the legislature. The Ohio Supreme Court,
in Gibbons v. Y. M. C. A., in which the court refused to go be-
yond the Avellone rule, has indicated also that any significant
change in the rule must come from the legislature. 11 2 Other
courts however did not wait for changes effected by the legisla-
ture. Justice Jacobs, in Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear In-
firmaries, had this to say about judicial change of the charitable
immunity doctrine:
Judges of an earlier generation declared the immunity be-
cause they believed it to be a sound instrument of judicial
policy. When judges of a later generation firmly reach a
contrary conclusion, they must be ready to discharge their
own judicial responsibilities in conformance with modem
concepts and needs.1 13
Justice Fuld, in Bing v. Thunig, speaking for the New York
high court, pointed out that
... if adherence to precedent offers no justice but unfair-
ness . . . it loses its right to survive and no principle con-
strains courts to follow it.
1 14
But after the New Jersey legislature re-established the
immunity rule, some courts in other jurisdictions were induced
to use more caution.
3. What is the law today?
The charitable immunity rule affords to churches greater
protection than to non-charitable corporations. This is clearly
illustrated by the Ohio and the Washington courts, and it is
indicated in judicial opinions of other jurisdictions. 115 Courts
are much more willing to abrogate the immunity rule when
109 Landgraver v. Emmanuel Lutheran Charity Board, 203 Ore. 489, 280 P.
2d 301 (1955).
110 Springer v. Federated Church of Reno, supra n. 94.
111 Miss. Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, supra n. 48.
112 Gibbons v. Y. M. C. A., supra n. 11.
113 Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, supra n. 7 at 283.
114 Bing v. Thunig, supra n. 7 at 9.
115 Hunsche v. Alten, 76 0. L. A. 68, 145 N. E. 2d 386 (1957); Lyon v. Turn-
water Ev. Free Church, supra n. 85.
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hospitals are sued than in the case of other charitable corpo-
rations, especially churches.116
Contrary to prognostications of the late 1950's and barring
unforeseen developments, it may be said that in the majority of
the American jurisdictions we will live for years to come with
the doctrine of total or qualified immunity of churches.
No immunity states. After the withdrawal of New Jersey,
the following states rejected the doctrine of charitable immunity:
Vermont, Minnesota, Iowa, New York, Arizona, California,
Delaware, Washington, D. C., New Hampshire (by statute),
North Dakota, Kansas and Utah. The highest court of Puerto
Rico and Alaska have indicated also that they will reject the
immunities of churches. In some other states we have similar
trends, but after recent developments in favor of church im-
munities, prognostications of future trends and decisions would
hardly be more than a guessing game.'17
Immunity states. In these states not only churches but other
charitable institutions are protected by court-made or by statu-
tory immunity doctrines. In most of these states, however, de-
mands by legal writers and dissenting opinions are trying to
pierce the walls of charitable immunities. 1 18 In these states the
immunity rule is not always entirely rigid. In Kentucky, for
example, if the injured patient is paying for hospital care, re-
covery may be granted.119 In Wisconsin gross negligence or
breach of statutory duties render churches liable. 120 States like
Ohio or Washington could be classified as immunity states con-
cerning church liabilities, but it seems to be better procedure to
enumerate in this category only those states which with the ex-
ception of border line cases recognize the immunity doctrine with
116 Foster v. R. C. Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230 (1950);
Andrews v. Y. M. C. A. of Des Moines, supra n. 5; Bing v. Thunig, supra
n. 7; Malloy v. Fong, supra n. 48; Durney v. St. Francis Hosp., supra n. 48;
Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, supra n. 5; R. Cath. Church v. Keenan,
supra n. 88; Noel v. Menninger Foundation, supra n. 92.
117 Tavarez v. San Juan Lodge, 68 Puerto Rico 681 (1948); Moats v. Sisters
of Charity of Providence, supra n. 91; Tuengel v. City of Sitka, supra n. 91.
11s Knecht v. St. Mary's Hosp., supra n. 77.
119 City of Louisville v. O'Donaghue, 157 Ky. 243, 162 S. W. 1100 (1914);
Roland v. Cath. Archdiocese of Louisville, 301 S. W. 2d 57-4 (Ky. 1957).
120 Wilson v. Ev. Lutheran Church of Reformation, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N. W.
708 (1930); Jaeger v. Lutheran Holy Ghost Congreg., 219 Wis. 209, 262 N. W.
585 (1930); Zimmers v. St. Sebastian' Congreg., 258 Wis. 496, 46 N. W. 2d
820 (1951).
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respect to every charitable institution. 121 These states are the
following: Massachusetts, South Carolina, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, Tennes-
see, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming and Nebraska.122
It is worthwhile to note that most of our highly industrialized
states are not among these jurisdictions. Illinois, which used to
be one of the immunity states after its recent court decisions,
has moved towards a more liberal qualified immunity doctrine. 123
Partial immunity states. The remaining states are put in
this category with great reluctance. Some of them are very
close to the non-immunity states and some of them are still
adhering to the doctrine of complete immunity,'12 4 especially
when they deal with the liabilities of churches. Still, they must
be placed in this category because in some degree or with re-
gard to some charitable corporations, mostly hospitals, the
principle of the immunity rule was discarded or at least dis-
regarded. 125
In these states the law of negligence is in a state of flux.
Mr. Justice Douglas said in another connection:
... but there are few areas of law in black and white. The
greys are dominant and even among them the shades are
innumerable. For the eternal problem of the law is one of
making accommodations between conflicting interests. This
is why most legal problems end as questions of degree.1 26
This statement could be well applied to these partial immunity
states where the courts attempt to balance the protection of the
injured individuals against the interest of charities. The various
courts use different methods to accomplish this. Some courts
distinguish between beneficiaries of charities and strangers.12 7
121 Hunsche v. Alten, supra n. 115; Rosen v. Concordia Ev. Lutheran Church,
supra n. 99.
122 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 44, at 786.
123 Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. 2d 342 (1947); Moore
v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. 2d 81 (1950); Slinker v. Gordon, 344 Ill. App.
1, 100 N. E. 2d 816(1951).
124 Howard v. South Baltimore General Hosp., 191 Md. 617, 62 A. 2d 816
(1956); Smith v. Duval City Welfare Board, supra n. 11; Landpover v. Em-
manuel Lutheran Bld., 203 Ore. 489, 280 P. 2d 301 (1955); McDermott v.
St. Mary's Hosp. Corp., 144 Conn. 417, 133 A. 2d 608 (1957).
125 Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., supra n. 45.
126 Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 545 (1948).
127 124 A. L. R. 815; 101 A. L. R. 413; Gollob v. Congreg. Chel Moishe
Chevre Tahilim, 119 Misc. 346, 196 N. Y. S. 517 (1922); Gibbon v. Y. M. C. A.,
supra n. 11; Silva v. Providence Hosp., supra, n. 48.
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Other courts sustain the immunity rule if due care was exercised
by charities in the selection of their agents or servants, and
apply the respondeat superior doctrine if such care was not
observed.128 Some courts went as far as to hold that certain
building codes were not applicable to religious corporations,'
1 29
while others refused to grant immunity to religious corporations
where the statutes spelled out liability for violation. 30 No
wonder that legal writers make strong remarks about the law
of negligence as applied to charities in some of these juris-
dictions: "The cases on this subject present an almost hopelessly
tangled mass of reason and unreason as it is not often confronted
in the law."' 31 It is only logical that the partial immunity states
were the ones which have moved towards discarding of chari-
table immunities.
132
Other states, like Ohio in the noted Avellone case, abolished
the immunities of hospitals in a well defined and narrow field.
133
In later cases, however, widening of this rule was promptly
refused. 3 4 It is pure speculation to connect this refusal with
the New Jersey immunity statutes, but it should be noted that
the Ohio court pointed out in a recent decision that the immunity
rule should be changed by the legislature. 13 5 Washington is in
a very similar situation.136 It may be well said that future
developments in these two states could be indicative of the future
of the immunity doctrine.
4. Recent decisions affecting the immunity rule.
Not even in the immunity states would the courts blanket
with the immunity rule all the fund raising and other business
activities of the church. The Massachusetts courts indicated
as early as in 1930 that a charitable institution may be answer-
able for negligence arising out of its commercial activities con-
128 101 A. L. R. 413; Bianchi v. South Park Presb. Church, supra n. 22.
129 Jaeger v. Lutheran Holy Ghost Congreg., supra n. 120.
130 Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, supra n. 5; Wilson v. Ev. Luth. Church
of Reformation, supra n. 120.
131 Zollman, American Law of Charities § 813.
132 Bing v. Thunig, supra n. 7; Malloy v. Fong, supra n. 48; Roman Cath.
Church v. Keenan, supra n. 48.
133 Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., supra n. 45.
134 Hunsche v. Alten, supra n. 115; Gibbon v. Y. M. C. A., supra n. 11.
135 Ibid.
136 Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass., supra n. 85; Lyon v.
Tumwater Ev. Free Church, supra n. 85.
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ducted for profit. This is true even when the profits of those
activities are applied wholly to its charitable purposes. The
court's opinion says
The distinction is between activities primarily commerical
in character carried on to obtain revenue to be used for
charitable purposes . . . where there is liability for negli-
gence, and activities carried on to accomplish directly the
charitable purposes of the corporation, incidentally yielding
revenue . . . where there is no liability for negligence.1
3 7
The same principle was applied by the Ohio Supreme Court,
in 1960, to churches. In Blankenship v. Alter 138 the syllabus
says:
1. Immunity from civil liability for negligence accorded
the charitable institutions, including religious organizations,
depends upon the actual devotion of the institution to
charitable purposes, and a charitable institution is liable
for negligence in the operation of a business enterprise for
profit not directly related to the purpose for which such
institution was organized.
2. A church in conducting a game of chance on its
premises for substantial profit is engaged in a business enter-
prise and is amenable to a tort action by a patron of the
game who sustained personal injuries by a fall when a
defective chair, supplied by the church in connection with
the game, collapsed. 139
The injured party was not a member of the church and
merely played bingo. Whether a church member or a recipient
of the charities benefits would recover is not quite clear, but
an answer in the affirmative is indicated in the opinion:
St. Joseph's church engaged in a business enterprise dis-
associated from the purpose for which it was organized.
140
While this decision is sound in reasoning and in its holding,
it contains possible elements of danger. In such a clear case
it was not difficult to establish the fact that the bingo game was
"dissociated" from the purpose of the church. But in other cases
where a court would be called to decide whether another activity
of the church was or was not "directly related to the purpose for
which such institution was organized," that court would in fact
137 McKay v. Morgan Co-operative Industries and Stores, 272 Mass. 121, 172
N. E. 68, 69 (1930).
138 Blankenship v. Alter, 171 Ohio St. 65, 167 N. E. 2d 922 (1960).
139 Ibid.
140 Id. 67.
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decide what constitutes a religious purpose. Such a decision
would always lie open to constitutional attack.
An "adjunctive use of property" is the other area where
even immunity states may find churches liable. In a tax exemp-
tion case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that such a use
is not religious in its nature, and thus not tax exempt.
41
This decision may suggest the weakening of churches' im-
munity as to parking lots and other properties not directly
connected with the religious activities of the church. During
recent years sizable properties have been purchased by churches
for parking lots and for church sites. The Pennsylvania rule or
its application to misfeasance and malfeasance on such properties
could have further implications.
Interstate activities of large church agencies and denomi-
national agents create interesting problems in the field of con-
flict of laws. Such a case is presented by Kaufman v. American
Youth Hostels.1 42 This was a wrongful death action decided by
the New York courts. A New York non-profit organization was
sued for a negligent act alleged to have been committed in
Oregon. The lex loci (Oregon) recognized the immunity rule,
while the law of the forum (New York) rejected it. The de-
fendant non-profit organization defended with the immunity
rule of Oregon. The New York court held that Oregon granted
immunity from torts committed within its jurisdiction only for
its own charitable organizations. Since a foreign corporation is
not protected by the Oregon rule, the New York non-profit
corporation would be held liable by Oregon state courts for the
same negligent act. The New York court gave judgment to the
plaintiff, stating that there were no indications that Oregon
would have held the New York corporation immune from torts
committed in Oregon.
5. Churches could protect themselves in liability states also.
(a) Liability insurance. Since the second world war the
availability of liability insurance policies has been one of the
most important practical reasons against the immunity doctrine
of churches and other charitable institutions. Justice Rutledge
dealt with this practical problem also.143 While it is true that
141 Second Church of Christ Scientist v. City of Philadelphia, 157 A. 2d 54
(Pa. 1960).
142 Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, 13 Misc. (N. Y.) 2d 8 (1958).
143 The President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, supra
n. 6; Miss. Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, supra n. 48.
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liability insurance cannot be the criterion of tort liability, still
since its availability, the cost of reasonable insurance protection
and not the amount of the damage claim should be balanced
against the right of individuals to be compensated for wrongful
injury.14 4 Proponents of the immunity rule are quick to point
out that stare decisis cannot be disregarded merely for such
practical reasons. A recent Ohio decision deals with the question
of insurance and stresses also that liability insurance is a poor
excuse for making churches liable. 145 One writer hastens to
point out the rising cost of this insurance wherever the immunity
rule is abrogated. Ohio serves as an illustration in this article,
and the author states that since the Avellone rule the price of the
liability insurance covering hospitals has steadily been increased:
first by 300% and in 1959 by 700%.
14 6
The majority of legal writers and many courts are of a
different opinion. Courts usually allow recovery against churches
even in some of the immunity states, up to the amount of the
liability insurance, using the trust fund theory to justify their
rule. This solution is called equitable since the trust funds are
not depleted and the injured party still may have at least partial
indemnity. In Arkansas, where the churches are immune, a
statute permits the injured person to recover from the insurer.147
Other courts recommend the purchase of liability insurance
policies as a matter "of good business judgment." 148
The New Jersey Superior court held in 1954 that a claim for
charitable immunity is an affirmative defense.149
It is, therefore, recommended that churches should have a
provision in their insurance contracts in which the insurer
agrees not to set up this affirmative defense. On the other hand
the insurance company may interpose any other defense avail-
able to a natural person or a private corporation.150
144 Ibid.
145 Rosen v. Concordia Ev. Luth. Church, supra n. 99.
146 Joachim, supra n. 12.
147 Ark. Stat. §§ 66, 517 (1947); O'Connor v. The Boulder Colorado Sana-
torium, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835 (1939).
14$ Howard v. South Baltimore General Hosp., supra n. 124; Stadem v.
Jewish Memorial Hosp., 239 Mo. App. 38, 55 S. W. 2d 142 (1951); Miss.
Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, supra n. 48; McCleod v. St. Thomas Hosp. 170
Tenn. 423, 95 S. W. 2d 917 (1936).
149 Rafferseder v. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp., 30 N. J.
82, 103 A. 2d 383 (1954); Taylor v. Knox County Board of Education, 292
Ky. 767, 167 S. W. 2d 700 (1942).
150 Flowers v. Board of Commissioners of County of Vanderburgh, 168 N. E.
2d 224 (Ind. 1960).
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Courts favoring the purchase of liability insurance point out
that the price of the liability insurance could be absorbed by the
paying patients of a hospital or by the members of churches.
An ever increasing number of churches are purchasing liability
insurance because they are aware of the ethical aspects of the
problem. In the congregation served by this writer as its pastor
such an insurance policy has been in force for a number of years.
At least on two occasions members of the congregation were
injured on the church premises. The insurer made a satisfactory
settlement on both occasions. The membership of the congre-
gation expressed great relief after the settlement. In the budget
of this average-size congregation the expense of the liability
insurance policy is not significant. This writer disagrees both
on ethical and practical grounds with a prominent writer and
crusader for the immunity doctrine who bluntly states that the
individual should carry the burden of losses rather than the
charitable institution. 1' 1
(b) The degree of care required from churches. In the
liability states it is important to establish the degree of care
required by the law for the protection of a certain class of
people. The degree of care varies, depending whether the law
puts church members, church-goers, or church workers in the
class of invitees or licensees. The first test applied by courts
for such a classification was the so-called "older test": (1) Was
there an invitation or encouragement to enter from the occupier
of the premises? (2) Did the occupier derive a benefit from the
visit, or did the occupier and the visitor derive mutual bene-
fits? 1 5 2
The new test is set out in §332 of the Restatement of
the Law of Torts. This test is often called the "economic test,"
or the business visitor test. In applying this test most courts
require the occupier to derive some actual or potential economic
benefit from the presence of the visitor.153
The "older test" would seem to show that a church-goer or
a church member should be made a licensee. It is clear that the
benefits are mutual. Since the primary reason for the church's
invitation and the visitor's presence is not economic, and the
benefits are intangible spiritual benefits, the test of the Re-
statement cannot apply to churches without reservation.
151 Joachim, supra n. 12; Gallagher v. Humphrey, L. R. 6 L. T. R. (N. S.)
684 (1862).
152 Paubel v. Hitz, 339 Mo. 274, 96 S. W. 2d 369 (1936); Brosnan v. Kauf-
man, 294 Mass. 495, 2 N. E. 2d 441 (1936).
153 Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 332 (1939).
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This seems to be the rule in McNulty v. Hurley,154 a
case based on sound principles. The plaintiff's action was based
on the contention that a churchgoer was an invitee. The court
rejected this contention and said:
A person who enters a religious edifice for purpose of
attending church service, does so for his own convenience,
pleasure and benefit and is at best a licensee.1 5
Concerning church workers, where the church has the pri-
mary benefit a New Jersey rule seems to be the more desirable.
That state's court gave judgment to a Sunday School teacher and
held that she was a "business invitee" since the church derived
benefit from her presence. Here again the test of the Restatement
was disregarded and the church was held to the highest degree
of care without deriving any economic benefit from the teacher's
presence. 150
It seems to this writer that along the line of these two
decisions an equitable solution could be found by giving the
church-goer the status of a licensee and the church worker the
status of an invitee.
Conclusion.
Most churches have accepted or at least tacitly approved
the immunity rule. This is the main reason for its existence. It is
obvious that neither courts nor legislatures would change it
in many jurisdictions without first looking to the attitude of the
churches. The churches themselves must, therefore, take a clear
stand concerning the fate of this doctrine. Consistent with their
divine teachings and high moral ideals the churches should re-
ject the immunity doctrine. This would help the law to find a
legally sound, socially desirable public policy in this field.
Until such time, churches should protect themselves with
liability insurance, and whenever possible with workmen's com-
pensation coverage. On the other hand the law should clearly
define the degree of care required from churches.
Most local congregations are unaware of this problem. Thus,
the initiative and the responsibility lies with their denominational
leaders.
154 McNulty v. Hurley, 97 S. 2d 185 (Fla. 1957).
155 Id., at 186; Coolbaugh v. St. Peter's Roman Cath. Church, 142 Conn.
536, 115 A. 2d 662, 664 (1955).
156 Atwood v. First Presb. Church, 26 N. J. Super. 607, 98 A. 2d 350 (1953).
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